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I.

INTRODUCTION

Harold Berman is one of the most important legal scholars of recent
decades, I think, and I want to begin with an observation from Berman’s
intriguing book Law and Revolution.1 Berman contends that the
Western legal tradition, the tradition that you and I inhabit, originated in
the eleventh century with the so-called Papal Revolution.2 Berman also
argues that this tradition has proven to be remarkably resilient: it has
survived and adapted itself to a series of wrenching revolutions including
* Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of
Law; B.A. Brigham Young University, 1976; J.D. Yale University, 1979. This essay
was presented as a public lecture in connection with a conference on my book, Law’s
Quandary, generously organized by Rick Garnett and held at Notre Dame in March
2006. I thank Larry Alexander, Michael Perry, George Wright, Rick Garnett, and
Merina Smith for helpful comments.
1. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION (1983).
2. See id. at 2.
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the Protestant Reformation, the French Revolution, and the Communist
Revolution.3 But Berman suggests, or at least he suggested some twenty
years ago when Law and Revolution was first published, that the tradition
may at long last have reached its terminus.4
“That the Western legal tradition, like Western civilization as a whole,
is undergoing in the twentieth century a crisis greater than it has ever
known before is not something that can be proved scientifically,”
Berman wrote.5 “It is something that is known, ultimately, by intuition.
I can only testify, so to speak, that I sense that we are in the midst of an
unprecedented crisis of legal values and of legal thought, in which our
entire legal tradition is being challenged . . . .”6 Berman went on to
assert that “the historical soil of the Western legal tradition is being
washed away in the twentieth century, and the tradition itself is threatened
with collapse.”7
A quarter-century later, Berman’s report of law’s impending demise
may seem greatly exaggerated. Law does not seem to have collapsed;
indeed, there seems to be a good deal of life left in the old corpus juris.
Though Berman himself was surely no “Crit,” perhaps he was
temporarily infected by the fever of the times in which Critical Legal
Studies diagnosed⎯or, according to some, constituted⎯a kind of deepseated malaise in law and legal thought.8
Whatever the influences may have been, though, Berman’s warning
was only one of many in a long line of such forecasts soberly⎯or, often,
sanguinely⎯predicting that law as we know it cannot long endure.
II. APOCALYPSE NOW, OR NEVER?
In his seminal essay on “The Path of the Law,” Holmes prognosticated
that traditional law-talk with its quaintly moralistic vocabulary, its
invoking and interpreting of formal-sounding doctrines, and its citing
and parsing and distinguishing of precedents would surely soon give
way to a bold new discourse self-consciously based on policy and
economics.9 “For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may
be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of
statistics and the master of economics.”10 This imminent transformation
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

See id. at 2, 18-19, 50.
See id. at 33-34.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id. at 39.
For an overview of the movement, see GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL
MOVEMENTS 106-27 (1995).
9. See O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
10. Id. at 469.
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was “the inevitable next step, mind, like matter, simply obeying a law of
spontaneous growth.”11
A generation or two later, Roscoe Pound and then the so-called Legal
Realists wrote in a similar spirit: formalistic or “mechanical” legal reasoning
was empty, and was destined to be replaced by a more policy-oriented
law expressly built around the learning of the social sciences. In this
vein, Felix Cohen described the “Restatement” project as “the last longdrawn-out gasp of a dying tradition.”12
Jumping forward in time to the 1980s, we might look not to the Crits,
who were perhaps predisposed to be gloomy, but to one of their favorite
and more mainstream whipping boys. In a colorful little book called
Reconstructing American Law, Bruce Ackerman argued that conventional
legal discourse is archaic and unsustainable, and he advocated a new
“constructivist” law-talk that would openly draw upon social science
and computer technology.13 And, of course, Judge Posner increasingly
describes “law” as it works today and, if Berman is right, as it has worked
for approximately the last millennium, not as a venerable tradition to be
celebrated for its deep indwelling rationality, but rather as an archaic
discourse that must be “overcome.”14
A couple of clarifications are in order here. First, I do not believe that
any of these thinkers doubted that some form of rule-making and rulefollowing are and will continue to be part of any collective human
enterprise. They were talking, I think, about the distinctive Western
legal tradition—one that displays features that Berman carefully
enumerated, 15 including the belief that the law has a “capacity for
growth over generations and centuries,” and that this growth occurs in
accordance with “an internal logic” that “reflects an inner necessity.”16
This conception of law underlies the patterns of distinctively lawyerly
argument that Holmes thought quaint and that outsiders may find, as
Cass Sunstein says, “weird or exotic.”17 It is that kind of law that the
prophets thought to be doomed.
11.
12.

Id. at 468.
Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 833 (1935).
13. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 46-104 (1984).
14. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995).
15. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 7-10.
16. Id. at 9.
17. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 13-14 (1996).
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Second, temperaments differ here. Some people find the apocalyptic
sensibility to be something entirely foreign and almost incomprehensible. I
myself am a pretty tame and unimaginative fellow, and so usually I find
myself in that quiescent mood. But I am also acquainted with the
apocalyptic mentality, I believe, through both first person and third person
experience. In my undergraduate days, my favorite book was Sorokin’s
The Crisis of Our Age.18 And I fondly recall in this respect a friend and
former colleague, of a “post-modern” bent and passionate disposition,
who would regularly burst into my office, Kramer-like, but with an air of
desperation. “It just can’t go on like this!” he would moan; I understood
“it” to refer to the legal enterprise as we currently teach and practice it.
From our vantage point, though, all of these doleful or gladsome
predictions of law’s demise may seem to be grossly in error. Indeed, in
the complacent jurisprudential lull we currently occupy, they may even
seem a bit deranged. Far from dying out, law seems in the second half
of the last century to have expanded its jurisdiction, as more and more
areas of life have been brought under the sway of “due process” or “rule
of law” or legalistic regulations of various sorts. Paul Campos argues
that we presently suffer not from the withering away of law but rather
from an excessive, obsessive legalism that he calls “jurismania.”19 And
of course we are currently working to transport our legalistic commitments
and institutions throughout the world, most conspicuously to the Middle
East.
Nor does the nature of legal reasoning seem to have changed
dramatically. To be sure, we in the academy⎯and a few select judges⎯are
probably more overtly attentive to policy, and particularly to economics,
than our predecessors seem to have been. However, by and large,
lawyers and judges argue and justify in pretty much the same forms that
they have been using for generations.20
Thus, historian and law professor Norman Cantor observes that “[a]
London barrister of 1540, quick-frozen and revived in New York today,
would only need a year’s brush-up course at NYU School of Law to
begin civil practice as a partner in a midtown or Wall Street corporate“For lawyers,” to quote E.P.Thompson, writing in 1975 of what he calls “the
greatest of all legal fictions,” “the law itself evolves, from case to case, by its
own impartial logic, true only to its own integrity . . . .” There is, of course, a
sense in which nobody really believes this any more, but it remains the case
that much legal behavior proceeds on the assumption that the law is like that.
For example, all legal argument in court makes this assumption.”
A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 10 (1995) (quoting E.P.
THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS 250 (1975)).
18. PITIRIM A. SOROKIN, THE CRISIS OF OUR AGE (1941).
19. See PAUL F. CAMPOS, JURISMANIA: THE MADNESS OF AMERICAN LAW (1998).
20. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY 241-42 (1997).
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law firm.”21 Even Richard Posner concedes as much. He glumly observes
that
Most lawyers, judges, and law professors still believe that demonstrably correct
rather than merely plausible or reasonable answers to most legal questions, even
very difficult and contentious ones, can be found—and it is imperative that they
be found—by reasoning from authoritative texts, either legislative enactments
(including constitutions) or judicial decisions, and therefore without recourse to
the theories, data, insights, or empirical methods of the social sciences . . . .22

So the prophets of law’s demise seem to have been woefully mistaken,
thus far anyway. And yet, isn’t there something at least intriguing about
the fact of these recurring jeremiads? Predictions of the end of course
are not unusual: we are all familiar with the street prophet who carries a
sign proclaiming “Repent! The end is near!” But usually such doomsayers
are regarded as marginal and pathetic characters. In law, by contrast,
confident predictions declaring that “law cannot go on this way” have
come not just from marginal types, or even radical Crits, but from the
central and revered thinkers of the profession. Holmes, Felix Cohen,
Bruce Ackerman, Richard Posner, Harold Berman—these are hardly
outcasts or reprobates in the legal community. On the contrary, they are
among its respected leaders and thinkers.
So, what are we to make of this recurring spectacle in which luminaries
of the enterprise repeatedly declare that the enterprise as traditionally
understood and practiced is near defunct and unable to continue on its
current footing—and these apocalyptic pronouncements over and over
again turn out to be mistaken, or at least seriously premature? If there is
nothing essentially wrong in a discipline, then it is all the more paradoxical
if many of its central figures repeatedly announce that there is something
essentially wrong or unsustainable.
So once again, what should we make of this situation? Reflecting on
that question might just tell us a good deal about what it is like to live, in
the law, or even in the Western neighborhood of the world, today.
III. THE PUZZLE OF INDETERMINACY
One way to approach the question is by reviewing what we might call
the indeterminacy problem—a problem, or at least a perceived one, that
21. NORMAN F. CANTOR, IMAGINING THE LAW: COMMON LAW AND THE FOUNDATIONS
OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 192 (1997).
22. POSNER, supra note 14, at 20.
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loomed over much of the more subversive or anguished jurisprudential
thinking of the last century. Let me hasten to say that I do not believe,
as some readers seem to have supposed,23 that indeterminacy is the
central “Law’s Quandary” that I discussed in a recent book with that
title.24 However, we can approach that quandary by thinking back about
the debate over indeterminacy.
We might start with another quotation from Holmes’s enormously
influential “Path of the Law” lecture.25 “You can give any conclusion a
logical form,” Holmes told his audience.26 “You can always imply a
condition in a contract. But why do you imply it?”27 Here is Holmes’s
answer: “Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth
and importance of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate
and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of
the whole proceeding.”28 The statement bears close examination because it
foreshadows one of the central debates, and directions, of twentiethcentury legal thinking.
“You can give any conclusion a logical form.”29 Holmes seems to say
here that the doctrines and rules of the law will support arguments
justifying either of contrary conclusions in particular cases. The lawyer
and judge will say that they reached their conclusion because the law so
required, but in fact the law would with approximately equal plausibility
have supported the opposite conclusion if they had been inclined to give
it. So the law is indeterminate.
As we know, Legal Realists like Herman Oliphant, Jerome Frank, and
Joseph Hutcheson elaborated in their different ways on this indeterminacy
claim.30 And a couple of generations later, the Crits again asserted
claims of radical indeterminacy in law, this time often with the help (or
the burden) of fancy Continental theorists like Derrida.31 Sometimes the
indeterminacy claim was pushed to almost absurd extremes, as in the
argument that the provision in the Constitution requiring that the

23. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Law’s Quest for Objectivity, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 711 (2006).
24. STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY (2004).
25. Holmes, supra note 9.
26. Id. at 466.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (Anchor Books 1963)
(1930); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch”
in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929); Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare
Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71 (1928).
31. See MINDA, supra note 8, at 117-18.
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President be thirty-five just might mean that the President could be a
teenager so long as he or she did not have acne.32
Defenders of law naturally saw the indeterminacy claim as subversive,
because if law were anywhere near as indeterminate as critics suggested,
then the elaborate (and lucrative) argumentation of lawyers and the
solemn pronouncements of judges might plausibly be regarded as a sort
of gigantic fraud on the public. But is law so indeterminate? At least on
first inspection, defenders seemingly had a strong empirical case that it
is not.
To be sure, academic lawyers can always spin out legal arguments for
contrary conclusions. And ordinary lawyers can do this as well or even
better than we academic lawyers can. So in every litigated case that
lingers on the docket for more than a moment, you can find motions
supported and opposed by legal-looking arguments set forth in legal
briefs mustering rules and authorities for diametrically opposed conclusions.
From a distance, it certainly looks as if legal reasoning can be used to
support contrary conclusions in most cases. The critics seem to have a
point.
But that criticism is superficial, law’s defenders respond. It is true
that in most cases, arguments for contrary conclusions can be offered.
And those arguments usually cannot be shown to be demonstrably and
formally incorrect in the way that, say, a student’s computation in a math
class can be shown to be faulty. Even so, experienced lawyers and judges
know that some of these arguments will be persuasive; other arguments,
by contrast, will quickly be recognized as, well, just not the sort of
argument that a normally constituted judge will actually find acceptable.
So while legal reasoning might look indeterminate in the abstract, the
abstract is not what counts. Legal reasoning, rather, is an embodied
“craft” in which lawyers and judges are initiated and apprenticed and
trained;33 it is a matter of “knowing how,” not merely “knowing that.”34
Its practitioners are “law-conditioned,” as Karl Llewellyn put it; they see
through “law-spectacles.”35 Once you understand that, you can appreciate
32. See Anthony D’Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 148, 150
n.11 (1990) (quoting Kenney Hegland, Goodbye to 2525, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 128, 129
(1990)).
33. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 109-62, 295 (1993);
Brett G. Scharffs, Law as Craft, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2245 (2001).
34. See Brian Leiter, Heidegger and the Theory of Adjudication, 106 YALE L.J.
253 (1996).
35. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 19 (1960).
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that there is in reality much more determinacy in law than meets the
uninitiated (or the perversely inclined) eye.
The fact that most cases are not appealed⎯because the lawyers
understand that appeal would be pointless⎯and that most cases that are
appealed are decided by unanimous benches is said to show that law is
tolerably determinate despite the possibility of making opposing legal
arguments.36 As Karl Llewellyn put it in his more mature stage, even
appellate cases are “reckonable . . . far beyond what any sane man has
any business expecting from a machinery devoted to settling disputes
self-selected for their toughness.”37
Suppose this counterargument is convincing: has the indeterminacy
worry been vanquished? Yes and no. Perhaps law is sufficiently predictable
for practical human purposes. But the basic problem is that even if legal
decisions are tolerably determinate and predictable, that determinacy
might derive from something other than the legal reasoning offered in
support of the decisions. Take an example: it might be that (a)
critically-minded theorists can show that in many or most abortion
cases, constitutional “privacy” doctrines can be arranged to support
contrary outcomes, but also that (b) political scientists can show that the
votes of individual justices can be reliably predicted based on the
justices’ political affiliation, religion, and so forth. Because experienced
lawyers are at least intuitively sensitive to these non-doctrinal factors,
they are relatively good at predicting how such cases will be decided. In
that case, it would seem to follow both (a) that the legal doctrine and
reasoning are seriously indeterminate even though (b) the actual
decisions in abortion cases (the results) are largely predictable.
Let me offer a homespun analogy, somewhat overstated to make the
point. You have just recently moved to the Big City, and you find that
in attempting to navigate its tangled streets, you are constantly getting
lost. But Uncle Albert, who has lived in the City all his life, explains
that you can always know which way to go if you just follow a few
simple rules—what he calls “the rules of directional driving.” “I always
follow these rules,” he explains, “and I never get lost.” This sounds
hopeful, so you ask what the rules are, and Uncle Albert explains that
there are just three rules:
Rule A: When you come to an intersection, turn left.
Rule B: When you come to an intersection, go straight.
Rule C: When you come to an intersection, turn right.

36.
37.
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This recitation of the rules leaves you a bit befuddled, but Uncle
Albert offers to help by giving you a navigation lesson. “Watch how I
do it,” he says, getting into the car. So you climb in, and he chauffeurs
you around the city. At a particular intersection, he turns left, and you
ask, “Why did you do that?” “Rule A, of course,” he explains. At other
junctures he goes straight or turns right, citing Rules B and C. “Like I
said, just follow the rules. You’ll never go wrong.”
“But just now, at that corner we just passed, Rule A seemed just as
applicable,” you protest. “Rule B did too. So how did you know which
rule to follow?” It is true that driving, for Uncle Albert, seems to be a
determinate, predictable activity—one with a lot of what Llewellyn
called “guidesomeness” and “reckonability.”38 Uncle Albert does in fact
seem to know where to go. And it is true that he can cite a supporting
rule for every decision he makes. But it does not seem that the rules are
doing the guiding.
When you offer these reservations, Albert might try to defend his rulefollowing account with a bit of sophistication. “Well, of course, it’s not
enough just to memorize the rules,” he might say, imitating law professors
in first-year classes. “You need to know how to use them. You need to
get the ‘feel’ of them.” Perhaps he adds, “It’s a matter not so much of
‘knowing that’ but of ‘knowing how.’ It’s a craft, not just a purely
mechanical process. As you get used to driving around the City under
the rules, you’ll figure out how to use them.”
In a sense Albert is right, and your own driving probably will become
more determinate⎯more “guidesome” or “reckonable”⎯as your familiarity
with the City grows. Eventually you will understand that although in the
abstract you could invoke Rule A at the corner of Fourth and Main when
you are on your way home from work, that would be wrong. In that
context, the me-going-home-from-work context, the Fourth and Main
intersection just is not a Rule A type of place; it is pretty obviously a
Rule C corner. So the rules work after all. Except that . . . it seems clear
that it is your familiarity with the city⎯your “Situation Sense” or “horse
sense,” to borrow again from Llewellyn⎯that is actually doing the work
and providing the determinacy,39 not the rules.
Of course, this is a simplified and exaggerated example. But in many
respects, the practice of law, in which lawyers provide respectable38.
39.

Id. at 3-6, 41.
Id. at 121.
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looking legal arguments for opposite conclusions but savvy lawyers
know which arguments are acceptable and which are not, may seem to
present a spectacle very much like Uncle Albert’s “rules of directional
driving.”
IV. TWO-FACED LAW
This, in any case, is what Holmes seemed to suggest and what many
of his descendants have believed. Thus, we finally come back to the
second part of the quotation from Holmes provided earlier. If it is true
that “you always can imply a condition in a contract,” then the next
question is, as Holmes said, “why do you imply it?”40 If the formal rules
and doctrines allow you to draw either conclusion and thus in themselves
and in the abstract appear to be indeterminate, but if something else
nonetheless provides substantial determinacy, then what is that something
else?
Holmes gave the answer that so many over the last century have
embraced: “Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative
worth and importance of competing legislative grounds . . . .”41 Holmes’s
suggestion ushered in a century of “law-and” in which legal discourse is
thought to be supported by some other discipline or form of decisionmaking,
and this other discourse (whatever follows the “and”) in reality does
most of the real work of making decisions. Probably the most conspicuous
candidate for the something else, as Holmes himself anticipated, has
been economics: underlying the formalistic facade of legal reasoning lies
a series of complex economic calculations aiming at the efficient use of
resources. But there are other candidates: moral philosophy, as Ronald
Dworkin urges,42 or the eclectic mix of elements that various theorists
try to bring together and dignify under the heading of “pragmatism.”43
Some such “law-and” understanding has come to be presupposed in
much or even most of modern legal thought, at least in its self-conscious
moods. So law has two levels, or two faces. At one level there is
economics, or policy analysis, or moral philosophy, or whatever it is that
actually drives legal decisions and gives them determinacy and rationality.
At another, more visible level, there are the official legal reasons and
justifications in which lawyers and judges dress up their views for public
presentation. So as Grant Gilmore observed some years ago (with a bit
of hyperbole): “For two or three generations past it has been the merest
40.
41.
42.
43.
4 (2002).
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truism, in much American legal writing, that the doctrine which may be
found enshrined in case report and treatise is neither important nor
relevant.”44 More recently, but in the same spirit, Jed Rubenfeld has
advocated “jettison[ing] the whole enterprise of taking constitutional
doctrine seriously” because the doctrine is a manipulable cover for
political purposes, so that “the only kind of question really worth asking
is whether the agenda pursued by a particular Court” is attractive.45
As I have said, this understanding of law as two-faced has become so
familiar that it seems pretty innocuous. Even as I describe it, I can see
some of you suppressing yawns. And yet, if we force ourselves to
assume a more detached perspective, I think this account of law comes
to seem quite fantastic.
Just on a descriptive or explanatory level, two-faced accounts make
garden-variety “conspiracy theories” look like the epitome of moderate
good sense. These accounts ask us to believe, basically, that hundreds of
thousands of lawyers and judges, coming from a large variety of backgrounds
and trained at a large variety of institutions, have learned to make legal
decisions on the basis of one kind of calculus while expressing their
views in a significantly different kind of reasoning. The lawyers and
judges behave like lawyers and judges in public, while at some private
level they are really thinking like economists or moral philosophers.
Seriously, how believable is this picture?
The plausibility of the two-level view is further challenged by the fact
that most lawyers and judges have not been trained, at least beyond a
highly superficial level, to do the kind of economic or philosophical
reasoning that supposedly informs their decisions. So if presented with
an examination going beyond the barest rudiments of economics or
moral philosophy, most of them⎯of us⎯would flunk miserably. If you,
like me, lack graduate training in economics, I challenge you to try to
read some of the more sophisticated law and economics literature. I
predict that you will find it almost wholly incomprehensible. So then,
how can we be making our decisions on the basis of reasoning we do not
even know how to perform?
Holmes proposed an answer that “law-and” theorists have sometimes
repeated. Lawyers and judges may not do the policy or philosophical

44. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 13 (1977).
45. Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141,
1177-78 (2002).
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analyses consciously, but rather subconsciously: they act on the basis of
“inarticulate and unconscious” judgments.46 In a similar vein, Richard
Posner asserts that “legal doctrines rest on inarticulate gropings toward
efficiency” and that “[a]lthough few judicial opinions contain explicit
references to economic concepts, often the true grounds of legal decisions
are concealed rather than illuminated by the characteristic rhetoric of
opinions.”47
Does this theory of “law-and-(a subconscious) whatever” make the
two level account more plausible? Suppose someone tells you that you
actually think x, but at a subconscious level, so that you are not actually
aware that you think x. Of course, this is an allegation that is not easy to
refute directly. I do not think, as some may, that the allegation is nonsensical:
Joseph Vining has convinced me that it is possible, and even common,
for us to believe things in an important sense without being fully conscious
of our beliefs. Still, you may wonder how this person knows what you
are thinking better than you yourself do. And you might naturally be
skeptical if, as in the Holmesian hypothesis, your conscious reasoning is
supposedly pretty much empty and indeterminate, so that it is the
subconscious level of thought that gives your decisions whatever
rationality and predictability they enjoy. After all, the subconscious has
typically not been thought to be the home of heightened rationality:
rather the reverse.
I admit that it may be gratifying to suppose that, like idiot savants, you
and I can actually perform economic calculations, or similarly abstruse
reasonings in moral philosophy, instinctively or intuitively. “Sure, Kip
Viscusi and John Finnis are pretty smart guys. They produce some fancy
displays of reasoning. But big deal! I can do that stuff in my sleep—or
at least without even thinking about it.” It might be pleasant to believe
this. Pleasant, but is it plausible?
Actually, this is not a purely rhetorical question. There are both
evolutionary and religious accounts of how we might be able to make
policy or moral judgments intuitively, and I myself am sympathetic to
such an account for what we usually though unfortunately call “moral”
judgments. So let us suppose that the two-faced account of law is
correct as a descriptive matter: What would that conclusion mean for
law as a normative institution?
I think the answer cannot be a happy one. Because even if law has
been rescued by “law-and” from suspicions of indeterminacy, it now
stands open to a more serious charge: namely, of rampant dishonesty.
Lawyers and judges are complicit, it would seem, in a systematic
46.
47.
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conspiracy to deceive the public about how legal decisions are actually
made. Even while giving what appears to be an elaborate and sophisticated
apology for law, Ronald Dworkin obliquely suggests as much. Thus, in
arguing for a “moral reading” of the Constitution in which constitutional
decisions are driven by moral philosophy⎯not merely by the sorts of
considerations actually evident in judges’ opinions, such as text or
original meaning or precedent⎯Dworkin suggests that all judges
necessarily engage in this sort of interpretation: those who do not
confess to doing so are guilty of a “costly mendacity.”48 But of course
this accusation would extend to nearly all judges, because not many
admit to interpreting the law on the basis of moral philosophy. So it
would seem that mendacity on a massive scale is at the heart of the legal
enterprise.
Suppose Dworkin is right, though. In that case, it is understandable
that lawyers and judges might be reluctant to admit their “mendacity,”
even (or especially) to themselves. So maybe they are deceiving themselves
along with the public. The suspicion would fit well with the theory,
noted a moment ago, that lawyers and judges perform their policy or
philosophical reasoning at a subconscious level, and hence are not aware
of what they are doing. Perhaps this conjecture furnishes them with an
excuse. But if we are assessing not the personal integrity of judges but
rather the moral attractiveness of the legal enterprise, that excuse does
not help much. If the implicit (and sometimes explicit) charge against
the legal profession is that “you are systematically deceiving the public,”
the defense that “we are systematically deceiving ourselves, too” seems
poorly calculated to elicit much admiration.
Indulge me in another overdrawn analogy. Suppose that you live in a
deeply astrological culture in which it is generally believed that the
configurations of the stars give wise guidance about how to conduct
human affairs. You are a precocious person, so you attend the best
astrology schools, graduate with honors, earn your astrology license, and
make partner in a “blue-chip” astrology firm. Gradually, though, you
come to believe that the stars are mindless globes of superheated gas
oblivious of human concerns, and that practical decisions would be
much better made on the basis of cost-benefit analyses. What do you
do?
48. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 37 (1996).
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For a while, perhaps you learn to do cost-benefit analyses in secret and
to dress up your arguments in astrological jargon when talking to others.
When you are in this mode, you find it convenient that astrological
“science,” while presenting itself as solid and determinate, is in fact
quite vacuous: its indeterminacy allows you to package just about any
cost-benefit calculation you might make in astrological terms.
But eventually you realize that you are not uniquely insightful: many
people (maybe even most) have come to perceive the emptiness of
astrology and the superior rationality of cost-benefit approaches. Many
have been resorting to the same two-faced stratagem that you have been
using. Now what to do? Well, because you happen to belong to the
astrologers’ guild, you and your fellows might try to carry on for a time
using the two-faced approach. Perhaps that is the only way to maintain
your guild’s beneficent influence in society. But this would be a deeply
compromised and unstable project, and one in which you could hardly
feel proud to participate. And as the rest of society comes to understand
what you understand, it is hard to imagine that the charade could
continue.
For a while, astrology might survive, with its mindlessness and pervasive
deception persisting as an “open secret” that everyone understands but is
not quite ready to own up to publicly. But you would have an impending
sense that things cannot continue in this way. Astrology, you might say,
“is threatened with collapse.” So the “death of astrology” would seem
imminent.
V. RECOGNITION DISCOURSE
So, is this our situation in law today? It might be, and if so, we could
understand why legal thinkers throughout the last century believed that
law could not go on in anything like its traditional form. But on this
view, it becomes harder to explain why all the prophecies have gone
perpetually unfulfilled. Why are the prophets of law’s demise always
wrong, as it seems they have been? Why does law persist, and even
flourish?
Perhaps the two-faced, “law-and” account of law has misconceived
the enterprise, and has given the wrong response to the diagnoses of
indeterminacy. But how? And what other responses might be possible?
One tempting response would repudiate “law-and” and deny the
necessity of what follows the “and.” More affirmatively, it would assert
the sufficiency and autonomy of law—of the formal legal reasoning that
the “law-and” proponents found insufficient and tried to supplement
with economics or moral philosophy or whatever. So it would deny that
what Holmes called “the fallacy of logical form” is a fallacy after all. In
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this spirit, over the last ten years or so we have seen a resurgence of
legal thinkers who proudly embrace what used to be an epithet—
“formalism.” The basic idea is to assert that legal decisions are, or at
least could be and should be, determined by the kinds of legal reasoning
presented on the face of lawyers’ briefs and judges’ opinions: textual
arguments, deductions from announced doctrines, and so forth.
The appeal of this “law is enough” formalism is understandable, I
think, but I also doubt that the formalist strategy will prove satisfactory
for very long. After all, the indeterminacy arguments of the Legal
Realists and Crits generated the massive enterprise of “law-and”
precisely because the arguments were, and are, powerful on their face.
Once again, the very existence of respectable-looking legal briefs on
both sides of the central questions in most cases is powerful evidence
that the purely formal resources of legal reasoning often fail to generate
determinate conclusions.
So, are there other alternatives? Well, here is a thought, or at least a
tentative and preliminary proposal. But as a starting suggestion, I
wonder whether we may have been pointed in wrong directions by the
overtones of the very notion of legal “reasoning.” Reasoning connotes
something deductive⎯the kind of thinking we associate with logic or
maybe proofs in geometry⎯and even if we acknowledge that in subjects
like law “reasoning” will not lead to certainties but more to probabilities,49
the term still suggests a deductive or quasi-deductive enterprise. There
are premises, and there are conclusions derived from premises. But it
seems to me that in life, much of our talk, including talk that is designed
to be deliberative or persuasive, does not work in this way. Rarely do
we actually reason deductively and even when we do, the deductive
logic is typically a post hoc affair—an exercise we use to test or rationalize
or support conclusions reached in other ways.
So then how does deliberation work? It seems to me that our
deliberative discourses often consist more of what we might call
“assisted recognition.” The assumption is that we already in some sense
know something, but we do not currently recall it. Or we do not recall it
in the vivid sense necessary to see its relevance to our present question.
Deliberative discourse consists of efforts to bring this tacit knowledge
49. See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, supra note 35, at 17 (“I see no absolute certainty of
outcome in any aspect of legal life, and think that no man should ever have imagined that
any such thing could be, or could be worth serious consideration. Instead I see degrees
of lessening uncertainty . . . .”).
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more fully to consciousness so that it can be appreciated, and so that its
relation to the present question can be recognized.
There are many, many examples of this sort of discourse. Some of
them are quite mundane or even trivial. We engage in recognition functions
in games—for example, the guessing game, or charades. Or maybe we
are trying to remember something, a song, perhaps, so that I remember
and sing a line or two and this brings the whole song back to your
memory. Or it might be a joke: “How does that one go, the one about
the farmer and the pig?” In each case, there is discourse designed to
help someone recognize the answer to a particular question. But the
discourse does not consist of deducing conclusions from premises.
Rather it consists of hints, fragments, partial descriptions, aimed to help
someone retrieve and recognize something they already in some sense
know.
Nor is recognition discourse limited to recollection, at least in any
ordinary sense. Suppose you go to a travel agent and say, “My spouse
and I are going to celebrate our twenty-fifth anniversary, and we’d like
to take a trip to some place really special, just right for the occasion. But
we can’t think where. Do you have any suggestions?”
The agent might reply with some suggestions that consist of abbreviated
descriptions.
“Hawaii?”
“Well . . . maybe. That would be fun.”
“Paris?”
“I don’t know. Paris would be romantic, but . . . .”
“How about Rome?”
“Ah, Rome. That would be perfect—just what we were looking for.”
In this conversation, the agent has engaged in a kind of discourse that
has helped you deliberate, and has “persuaded” you to adopt a particular
decision. But the discourse is hardly deductive in nature. Rather, it has
helped you bring to mind, and to recognize as the answer to your
question, something you already knew at some level. Of course, it might
be that merely reciting the names of places would be insufficient. The
travel agent might need to fill out the descriptions somewhat: “Palm
trees, beaches, volcanoes.” The talk might get quite detailed, supplemented
by brochures and pictures. And it might be partly propositional in form:
“There’s a wonderful little restaurant—and not so expensive—just a
short walk from the Colosseum.” It might be that you have never actually
been to Hawaii or Paris or Rome. Nonetheless, you know something about
them and you have an image of what they are, and the travel agent’s
suggestions help to bring them to consciousness so that an image is present.
You can see the image that seems to be an answer to your question.
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Suppose someone were to object, after listening to this conversation,
that the travel agent’s suggestions were utterly indeterminate: “Sure, he
said some things and then you chose Rome. But he said things that
could just as easily have supported Paris, or Hawaii. You say⎯you may
even think⎯that you were influenced to choose Rome by what the travel
agent said to you. But it is obvious that all of that talk was just
cosmetic, for public presentation, and you actually chose Rome based on
something else.” How cogent would this criticism be?
I suggest that if we pay attention, much or even most of what we say
when we are trying to deliberate or to persuade each other is of this
“recognition discourse” variety. Rarely do we actually cause people to
deduce conclusions from premises in any formal way. Rarely are the
considerations we urge on people “determinate.” But we do not think
that this lack of deductive determinacy is a shortcoming that makes our
discourse empty. Nor do we infer from the indeterminacy of our discourse
that what we say is a mere facade and that something else must really be
driving the decisions. Recognition discourse is not “two-faced” but
rather what we might call “partial featured”; it consists of hints, suggestions,
partial descriptions, that point us to things we already in some sense
know. Our discourse is not a complete description of those things that
we eventually accept as the answers to our questions. But the discourse
is nonetheless about those things; it is not merely a facade for something
different (the “real reasons”) that drive our decisions.
VI. REAL LAW?
If you accept my suggestion that much of our deliberative and
persuasive discourse is of this “recognition” variety, then questions
promptly follow. Why is it that “recognition” discourse seems so little
recognized as a legitimate kind of reasoning? And what if anything does
any of this have to do with law?
These are hard questions, and I can only offer a few tentative thoughts
in response. First, anyone could readily grant that “recognition”⎯and the
processes by which human beings “recognize”⎯presents an important
and fascinating subject. However, the subject might seem to be within
the domain of cognitive psychology, not of philosophy or of jurisprudence.
Philosophers, ideally at least, want to know truth, or at least to consider
how we can apprehend truth, so they study logic and epistemology. But
how could the psychological processes that produce recognition provide
any epistemic credentials to the beliefs we come to hold?
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To be sure, on older, Platonic assumptions, knowledge has sometimes
been viewed as a kind of recollection.50 But if you think with Locke that
the mind is a tabula rasa, or if you hold the modern or post-modern
view that order and value are constructed or imposed, then it is not so
clear how “recognition” could provide any indicia of truth, or rational
acceptability.
This reservation seems particularly powerful with respect to law, at
least on modern views. Put it this way: the notion that “recognition”
could play a central role in the acquisition of truth seems to presuppose
that (a) there is something real “out there”⎯or at least something that
exists independent of our opinions about it⎯that is the subject of some
question we have; and (b) we already have some at least dim or
submerged knowledge of that something, whatever it is. On these
assumptions, the hints and partial descriptions that make up recognition
discourse might help point us to that object of our inquiry. We might
then retrieve and contemplate the object more deliberately and come to
perceive how it provides the answers to the questions we are asking.
Thus, if “law” in some sense existed independent of our talk about law,
then it is just conceivable that law-talk would properly be viewed as a
sort of halting, partial description seeking to bring that object—the
law—into clearer view, so that we could see how particular legal
questions should be answered. The “weird” or “exotic” law-talk might
be not so much like premises supporting a deduction as like the snatches
of a song that help us recall the whole song (or at least a stanza or two)
which we can then apply to the case at hand.
Conversely, if law is not in any sense “real” independent of us, that is,
if it is purely man-made or conventional, then it is harder to see how
law-talk could be serving this function. So then it would seem that our
alternatives would be more limited. Law-talk—legal reasoning and
justification—could be formal and deductive. Or else it might be a cosmetic
facade for other forms of reasoning. What other possibilities exist?
And here I believe we get to the heart of the modern quandary of law
and legal thought. In pre-modern or what we might call “classical” legal
thought, it seems, law was understood to be something real and independent
of human actors. Hence, judicial decisions were routinely described not
as “of themselves, laws,” as Joseph Story put it, but rather as “evidence”
of law—of something real that transcended them.51
50. The claim that knowledge is recollection is developed in Plato’s dialogue
Meno. See PLATO, Meno, in MENO AND OTHER DIALOGUES 97, 123 (Robin Waterfield
trans., 2005).
51. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18 (1842) (emphasis added). For a learned and
helpful discussion of this view, see Charles J. Reid, Jr., Judicial Precedent in the Late
Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Century, AVE MARIA L. REV. (forthcoming).
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It is far beyond the scope of this lecture, and even farther beyond my
competence, to elaborate in just what sense law was thought to be real.
For now I hope it is sufficient to say that law was viewed as part of
God’s providential scheme for the cosmos. Probably the most complete
and important account of this view was given by Thomas Aquinas, but
the view was reiterated in abbreviated form by legal thinkers through the
centuries, from Fortescue to St. Germain to Coke to Blackstone.
No doubt this view raises lots of questions, both about the nature of
law and about how humans can know the law. I would not presume to
say whether there are satisfying answers to all of those questions. I am
content to put forward a modest and heavily qualified proposition: the
classical view at least embraced the presuppositions necessary to accept
the theoretical possibility that legal reasoning might be a way of
apprehending⎯of “recognizing”⎯something that actually existed and
that was responsive to the questions people ask of law. Robert Gordon
makes the point colorfully: quoting Richard Hooker’s statement that law
sits in “the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world,” Gordon
observes that pre-Holmesian lawyers “had, as they saw it, a direct line to
God’s mind through their knowledge of the principles of legal science.”52
Things are different today. Holmes might be taken as the watershed
thinker who moved us from a classical to a modern view, or at least the
most vivid expositor of that transition.53 Although Holmes himself
seems to have found the classical view pretty much incomprehensible,
he at least perceived its basic contours. If you read books about law,
Holmes observed, “it is very hard to resist the impression that there is
one august corpus, to understand which clearly is the only task of any
Court concerned.”54 The assumption seems to be that there is “a
transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory
within it unless and until changed by statute . . . .”55 Conventional lawtalk implicitly treats law as a “brooding omnipresence in the sky.”56 But

52. Robert W. Gordon, The Path of the Lawyer, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1013
(1997) (quoting I RICHARD HOOKER, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, in THE WORKS
OF RICHARD HOOKER 197, 285 (John Keble ed., 7th ed. 1888)).
53. For a helpful recent exploration of this transition from a different perspective,
see BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (2006).
54. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
55. Id.
56. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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in fact this notion was patently “fallacy and illusion,” because nothing of
the sort exists.57
With few exceptions, twentieth-century legal thinkers followed Holmes
in this respect. Sometimes they recognized, at least dimly, what had
happened. Karl Llewellyn noted that the classical approach to precedent
had reflected the fact that for centuries, “law was felt as something
ordained of God, or even as something inherently right in the order of
nature,” though he peremptorily dismissed this view as “superstition.”58
Felix Cohen conceived that the modern task in law was to “redefine
supernatural concepts in natural terms.”59
As the twentieth century progressed, or declined, few legal thinkers
gave evidence of even perceiving the framework of presuppositions
within which they—we—operate. The possibility of law in the classical
sense hardly even occurs to us anymore. It is hard for us even to
conceive of what such a law could be, and so we are naturally suspicious
that anyone ever did have a satisfying conception of such a law: hence
the seemingly irresistible resort to “law-and.”
But a two-faced “law-and” account is an unhappy and unstable resting
place, for reasons I have noted earlier. And so it has seemed to those
who bothered to think about the situation that this awkward marriage
cannot continue. The “law” side of the “law-and” must somehow be
transformed, must give way to policy science, or “constructivist” legal
discourse, or a more overt use of moral philosophy, or something more
discernibly rational.
VII. WHERE AND WHITHER?
Hence the recurring predictions of law’s demise. In our times, law is
always on the verge of dying, or of being “overcome,” or superseded by
something bold and new and more palpably rational.
And yet . . . law does not have the decency to just die. Instead, it remains
as vigorous as ever. What to make of this inconsiderate persistence?
In the final chapter of Law’s Quandary I discuss some possible
diagnoses, but the most eligible candidates, I think, boil down to two.60
It might be that conventional law-talk is a holdover—a vestige of a
world view that is no longer plausible, and is barely even entertainable.
Law is a remarkably tenacious holdover, clinging to life and indeed
apparently flourishing long after it was supposed to have died. Because

57.
58.
59.
60.
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earlier predictions of its demise have repeatedly fallen flat, we should
probably be careful in our forecasts. But law-talk is a holdover nonetheless,
and destined for eventual extinction.
Or it might be that, in some sense and at some level, we tacitly believe
or are committed to believing more than we think or admit we believe.
The “brooding omnipresence in the sky” that Holmes mocked is a
metaphor, of course, but maybe it is a metaphor for something that is not
so unthinkable after all. Maybe law-talk is a way of bringing us to some
sort of recognition of that omnipresence. And maybe theorizing about
law is a kind of exploration that, as Joseph Vining has repeatedly
proposed, searches for something (or someone) with an authority that we
did not construct,61 and maybe, to borrow now from T. S. Eliot, “the end
of all our exploring/Will be to arrive where we started/And know the
place for the first time.”62
Just to keep us guessing, or to be grand or perhaps perverse, Holmes
said this too:
The remoter and more general aspects of the law are those which give it
universal interest. It is through them that you not only become a great master in
your calling, but connect your subject with the universe and catch an echo of the
infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal law.63

If this more mystical Holmes was right, then the sequel to a lecture on
“The (Always) Imminent Death of the Law” might be something like “The
Eternal Return of Natural Law.” But somebody else will have to give that
lecture. Actually, I think somebody already has.64

61. See JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN (1986);
JOSEPH VINING, FROM NEWTON’S SLEEP (1995).
62. T.S. ELIOT, Little Gidding, in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS 138, 145
(1952).
63. Holmes, supra note 9, at 478.
64. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS
ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 295 (1960).
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